Entrepreneurship, Brands and the Development of Global Business by Lopes, Teresa da Silva & Casson, Mark
ORGANIZAÇÕES EM CONTEXTO
Organizações em contexto, Ano 3, n. 6, dezembro 2007180
ABSTRACT
This paper provides an account of how entrepreneurs
have contributed to the development of successful global
brands in consumer goods industries along the twentieth
century and why so few independent brands survived the
merger waves of the 1980s. The industries analyzed are
those where the promotion of the brand relies principally
on advertising rather than the technology embodied in
the product. Drawing on cross-industry and cross-coun-
try comparisons of brands in consumer goods, and using
a ‘stretched’ definition of the entrepreneur, the paper
highlights the entrepreneurial and innovative strategies
pursued by brand managers. It emphasizes the role of
distinct types of entrepreneurs and marketing knowl-
edge in the creation and development of brands in suc-
cessful global businesses.
Keywords: successful global brands; entrepreneurs;
marketing knowledge.
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RESUMO
Este artigo analisa a maneira como os empreendedores
contribuíram para o desenvolvimento de marcas globais
bem sucedidas na indústria de bens de consumo no sé-
culo XX, e porque, assim, tão poucas marcas independen-
tes sobreviveram às ondas de fusão dos anos 1980. As
indústrias analisadas são aquelas nas quais a promoção de
marca baseia-se, principalmente, no anúncio publicitário
e não  na tecnologia carregada pelo produto. Desenhando
uma comparação cruzada na indústria e comparações
cruzadas entre países das marcas em bens de consumo e
usando uma definição “ampliada” de empreendedor, o
artigo salienta as estratégias empreendedoras e
ino-vadoras, buscadas por gerentes de marca e dá  ênfase
a tipos distintos de empreendedores e de conhecimento
de marketing na criação e no desenvolvimento das mar-
cas em negócios globais bem sucedidos.
Palavras-chave: marcas globais bem sucedidas; empre-
endedores; conhecimento mercadológico.
OVERVIEW
There is a wide literature in business history, economics and
management studies on the role of the entrepreneur in explaining the
growth of firms and of successful brands. These studies tend to focus
on a single entrepreneur, who was usually the founder of the firm,
and created a single successful product and brand with distinctive
characteristics. This study expands the definition of the entrepreneur,
allowing us to consider innovative management as a kind of entrepre-
neurial activity. Furthermore, while researchers such as Schumpeter
tend to associate the role of the entrepreneur with invention and
innovation in technology-based industries, here the analysis focuses
on marketing-based industries, where innovation relies on other
activities such as branding. Marketing knowledge is defined as the
intelligence and skills that exist within the firms concerning the man-
agement of brands and distribution channels.
This study examines the lives of successful brands in global
marketing-based industries and traces their trajectories, from the time
they were created until the present day. It analyses the roles of the
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial managers that helped develop
those brands. Successful brands are defined as those that became
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leading (measured in terms of market share) in their product catego-
ries in the relevant markets (domestic or global). Global brands are
those sold in multiple markets using similar marketing strategies,
even if in practice only a small number of such markets accounts for
most of the sales. In this study a brand is considered to go from in-
ternational to global when there is almost total standardisation in the
marketing strategy of that brand across different markets.1
The industries analysed are those where the promotion of the
brand relies principally on advertising (brand image and other in-
tangible assets) rather than on product performance (attributable
to tangible assets such as high quality production plant).2 In such
industries, conventional forms of invention (associated with
patenting) are minimal, and so we must look elsewhere for inno-
vative behaviour. Relevant industries include food and drink,
fashion and cosmetics. Some of the global brands studied are
Smirnoff vodka, Carlsberg beer, Perrier water, Lancôme beauty
products, Gucci fashion, Nescafé coffee, and KitKat chocolate.3
Some of these are long-established brands, going back to the
nineteenth century, whilst others are more recent. The key find-
ing is that the long-run success of a global brand depends not just
on the entrepreneurial flair of the individual founder but on the
subsequent refinement and rejuvenation of the brand by entrepre-
neurial marketing managers in multiproduct multinational firms.
The choice of a group of successful brands in particular in-
dustries leads naturally to the selection of firms to be analysed.
These are firms which owned such brands at particular points in
time. Some are leading multinationals, whilst others are small
firms. As the paper will show, frequently the personality-centred
entrepreneurs who created the brands are distinct from the or-
ganisation-centred entrepreneurs who, from managerial positions,
adapted the brands to changing supply and demand conditions by
turning them into successful global brands.
1 D. A. Aaker, E. Joachimsthaler, ‘The lure of global branding’, Harvard Business
Review (1999), 137-44.
2 In order to place a particular brand and the industry where it operates in this spectrum
of alternatives we can use a proxy – number of patents registered each year
weighted by the size of the industry. See for example United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Patent Counts by Class by Year, Jan. 1977- Dec. 31, 2001.
3 See these brands rankings in the world’s top brands in Interbrand, The 2006 Best Glo-
bal Brands Report, 2006.
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Most of the brands analysed changed ownership during their
lives. Many of the brands have outlived the firms that first developed
them. This is just a consequence of the method of sampling used in
this paper, but appears to reflect a basic feature of the lives of brands
in consumer goods industries. Only a few global brands have re-
mained in the ownership of the same firm throughout their lives.
Most of the firms concerned are controlled by families, trusts, or a
small group of major shareholders. They have been relatively im-
mune to pressure from independent shareholders to maximise short
term payment of dividends. They also tend to be headquartered in
a country in which larger firms can rely on long-term support from
banks rather than being obliged to issue equity to finance expansions,
as is the norm in some countries; examples are Carlsberg from Den-
mark, Asahi Brewery from Japan, and Nestlé from Switzerland.
The study goes beyond conventional analysis of the role of the
entrepreneur in the growth of firms. The cross-industry and cross-
country comparison of entrepreneurial activity highlights the role
of different types of entrepreneurs and of distinctive kinds of mar-
keting knowledge in the creation and development of successful
global brands. It first analyses and compares the traditional concept
of entrepreneur with the ‘stretched’ version used here. It then analy-
ses the different trajectories followed by the sample of brands in
their lives. The cases are classified according to the types of trajec-
tories. The study then looks at the relationship between the stages
in the lives of brands, types of entrepreneurs and resources they re-
quire. The conclusion highlights the evolving needs for different
types of entrepreneurs and resources in the lives of brands, and
considers the applicability of this analysis to other industries.
TRADITIONAL VERSUS STRETCHED DEFINITIONS OF ENTREPRENEUR
It has been widely acknowledged that entrepreneurship and
innovation are vital forces in explaining the development of big
business, international business and global competitiveness of
economies in general.4 Yet, there is little consensus about what en-
4 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed.(London, 1927/1961): 544; J. A.
Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1934);
Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass., 1962): 284; idem,
Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass., 1990): 597, 830-31; Mark Casson,
‘Entrepreneurship and the International Business System: Developing the Perspective
of Schumpeter and the Austrian School’ in Mark Casson, Economics of International
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trepreneurial activity and innovation actually entail.5 Conventional
studies define the entrepreneur as ‘someone who specialises in tak-
ing judgemental decisions about the coordination of scarce re-
sources with an economic aim and under conditions of uncertainty’.
This means that the entrepreneur is not necessarily a capitalist or
an inventor, but instead is someone who is not afraid of risk and
who ‘gets things done’ with an economic aim.6 Following Casson
(1982), this paper uses a stretched definition of the entrepreneur, in
this study the traditional and the stretched definition of the entre-
preneur differ in the type of entrepreneurial activities they engage
in, and the resources they require. This economic definition has
much in common with the distinction in the managerial literature
between exploratory and exploitative behaviour of firms.7 The tra-
ditional entrepreneur focuses exclusively on exploration, while the
‘stretched’ entrepreneur is involved in exploitation too. The tradi-
tional entrepreneur originates new products of consistent quality
and gives those products their brand names. Traditional entrepre-
neurs are usually associated with single brand firms, especially fam-
ily businesses, which have a deep knowledge of their local environ-
ments. The stretched entrepreneur has the additional capability to
extend, rejuvenate and globalise existing brands, using a different
kind of marketing knowledge. The ‘stretched’ entrepreneur may
work in either a small independent firm – which he grows into a
Business (Cheltenham, 2000); idem, ‘Entrepreneurship and Business Culture’, in
Jonathan Brown and Mary B. Rose (eds.), Entrepreneurship, Networks and Modern
Business (Manchester, 1993); George H. Evans Jr, ‘A Theory of Entrepreneurship’,
The Journal of Economic History, Vol.2 (Dec. 1942): 142-146; Youssef Cassis and
Ioanna Pepelasis Minoglou (eds.), Entrepreneurship in Theory and History (New
York, 2005).
5 There are numerous definitions of entrepreneurs, each one highlighting a distinct
dimension of entrepreneurial behaviour. The most prevalent ones focus on the
entrepreneur’s perception of new economic opportunities and his capacity to
introduce and implement new ideas in the market. See for example the definition
proposed by the OECD. OECD, Fostering Entrepreneurship (Paris, 1998); Mark
Casson et al, The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship (Oxford, 2006), chapter 1; and
W. B. Gartner and N. M. Carter, ‘Entrepreneurship Behaviour: Firm Organizing Pro-
cesses’, in Z. J. Acs and D. B. Audretsch (eds.), The International Handbook of
Entrepreneurship (Dordrecht, 2003): 195-221; R. F. Herbert and A. N. Link, ‘In Search
of the Meaning of Entrepreneurship’, Small Business Economics 1 (1989): 39-49.
6 Joseph A. Schumpeter, ‘The Creative Response in Economic History’, Journal of
Economic History, VII (2), November (1947): 149-59.
7 James G. March, ‘Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning’,
Organization Science, Vol.2 (1991): 71-87.
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large firm – or he may work in large firm from the outset, normally
as a marketing director or CEO. If we leave aside newly established
sectors, particularly those of the ‘digital economy’ and focus on well-
established firms, it seems little more than a truism to argue that the
traditional type of entrepreneur was more common in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, as these firms were set up,
while the ‘stretched’ type is more characteristic of developed coun-
tries in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
tury, as established firms looked for new markets and new ways of
doing business.8
BRANDS’ TRAJECTORIES
This study develops the concept of the ‘life of brands’ to ex-
plain why and how, in different industries, brands emerge, evolve
and become global, staying ‘forever young’. It traces the lives of
brands from their creation until the present day. However, par-
ticular focus is placed on the period from the 1980s, when liber-
alisation of markets took place, world trade and foreign direct
investment increased and the global merger waves accelerated. In
this process only a small number of successful global brands sur-
vived independently, not changing hands.
During the period covered trademark legislation was in force
in the major economies, and so were brands or trademarks as le-
gally defensible proprietary names. Brands are recognised by con-
sumers as a signal that the product satisfies basic requirements for
consistency and quality (so-called vertical differentiation) and that
it embodies a unique combination of characteristics that differen-
tiates it from other brands (so-called horizontal differentiation).9
8 J. Panglaykim, ‘The Entrepreneur and Growth and Development Corporations’, Asian
Survey, Vol.19, No.7 (Jul, 1979): 707-717.
9 For alternative definitions of brands see Kevin Lane Keller, Strategic Brand
Management (London, 1998): 4; Leslie de Chernatony and Malcom McDonald,
Creating Powerful Brands (Oxford, 1998); Leslie de Chernatony and G. McWilliam,
‘The Varying Nature of Brands as Assets’, International Journal of Advertising, Vol.8
(1989): 339-49; idem, ‘Brand Consultants’ Perspectives and the Concept of the Brand’,
Marketing and Research Today, Vol.25, No.1 (1997): 45-52; G. Michel and Tim
Ambler, ‘Establishing Brand Essence Across Borders’, The Journal of Brand
Management, Vol.6, No.5 (1999): 333-45; Kevin Lane Keller, ‘The Brand Report Card’,
Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb., 2000): 147-57; S. Hart and J. Murphy, Brands: The
New Wealth Creators (London, 1998); David A. Aaker, Building Strong Brands (New
York, 1996); Peter Doyle, ‘Building Successful Brands: The Strategic Options’, Journal
of Marketing Management, v. 5, n.11 (1989): 78.
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Brands are seen as an important mechanism by which firms com-
municate with consumers and cultivate their loyalty. They add
value to the firm by sustaining a continuing revenue stream be-
cause of the consumer propensity for long-term brand loyalty.10
Brands also create ‘personalities’ for products or services.11 These
personalities usually combine performance or tangible character-
istics of products with imagery or intangible characteristics. In
some cases such as in the automotive industry, the performance
aspects outweigh other characteristics of the personality of the
brand.12 In others, imagery predominates.13 This is the case of al-
coholic beverages brands for example, as production technologies
tend to be quite standardised, in either, wines, spirits or beer.14
The account provided here of the evolution of firms and brands
in the beauty industry, bottled water, chocolate, and fashion,
where technological innovation is not in itself a condition for com-
petitive advantages of the firm and success of the brand, also aims
to show the importance of imagery in marketing. The concept of
the ‘life of brands’ is used here to illustrate the different trajecto-
ries followed by individual brands. Table 1 lists the lives of the
brands analysed in this study. It shows the industry where the
10 P. Barwise and T. Robertson, ‘Brand Portfolios’, European Management Journal,
Vol.10, No.3 (1992): 277-85.
11 J. A Aaker, ‘Dimensions of Band Personality’, Journal of Marketing Research,
Vol.34, No.3 (1997): 347-56.
12 However, car companies are increasingly investing in marketing campaigns which
highlight intangible aspects of the products creating associations of status or lifestyle
with the product,
13 The intangible characteristics of brands can either be functional and objective (such as
quality, value for money and consistency) or abstract and emotional (reflecting
psychological and social values such as prestige associated with products from a certain
region or country and heritage). Leslie de Chernatony, Brand Management (Aldershot,
1998); Leslie Chernatony and Francesca Dall’Olmo Riley, ‘Defining a Brand: Beyond the
Literature with Experts’ Interpretations’; Journal of Marketing Management, Vol.14, No.5
(1998): 417-43; S. King, Developing New Brands (Bath, 1973).
14 For a discussion of technological developments see for example: in beer see Terry
Gourvish and Richard G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry, 1830-1980 (Cambridge,
1994); in wines and spirits see John Cavanaugh and Frederick F. Clairmonte, Alcoholic
Beverages: Dimensions of Corporate Power (London, 1985); in food see Roy Church
and Christine Clark, ‘Product Development of Branded Packaged Household Goods in
Britain, 1870-1914: Colman’s, Reckitt’s and Lever Brothers’, Enterprise and Society 2
(2001): 503-542; in the beauty industry see Geoffrey Jones, ‘Globalising the Beauty
Business before 1980’, Harvard Business School Working Papers (June 2006); and in
fashion see Regina Lee Blaszczyk, ‘Styling Synthetics: DuPont’s Marketing of Fabrics
and Fashions in Postwar America’, Business History Review, Vol.8, No.3 (2006).
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brands are from, when they were launched and the different
owners they have had. It also shows the countries of origin of
these owners, down to the present day. Ownership refers either to
the names of the personality-centred entrepreneurs who created
and developed the brands or the names of those firms whose or-
ganisation-centred entrepreneurial managers transformed those
brands into successful global brands.
Table 1 indicates four key patterns in the lives of imagery
brands, irrespective of their industry. Firstly, very few brands
(Carlsberg, Nescafé and Asahi Super Dry) remained successful and
became global under the single ownership and management of the
entrepreneurs who created them or their descendants. Secondly,
brands may change ownership in multiple ways. They may be
traded together with the firms that own them, through mergers
and acquisitions; may involve just the transfer of brand ownership
independently from firms; or just the transfer of ownership though
licensing agreements. Thirdly, ownership of modern brands is con-
centrated in a relatively small number of countries.15 The high levels
of investment necessary to manage global branded products, and
the complex networks required to distribute them worldwide, ex-
plain why these global brands are based in Western countries such
as the United Kingdom, United States, France and Switzerland or
Japan, in which organisation-centred entrepreneurs have opportu-
nities to prove their worth, and receive recognition for their success.
These are also countries where the nature of the educational system
(in particular with the specialization of degrees), the relative status
of entrepreneurial careers, the regulatory environment, the religious
beliefs and the entrepreneurial culture in general, are all favourable
to the development of entrepreneurship.16 The fourth pattern con-
cerns the timing of changes in brand ownership. There was a high
turnover in the ownership of brands during the 1980s, when the
15 UNCTAD statistics show that a high proportion of outward foreign direct
investment in consumer goods industries is concentrated in a very limited number
of countries. World Investment Report (New York, 2002).
16 For a review of the literature of how the different determinants affect entrepreneurship
see Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Business
History (Oxford, 2007, forthcoming). See also Mark Casson, ‘Entrepreneurship and
Business Culture’, in Jonathan Brown and Mary B. Rose (eds.), Entrepreneurship,
Networks and Modern Business (Manchester, 1993).
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Table 1 – The life of brands
Sources: various companies’ archives, histories, newspaper articles,
and annual reports and accounts.
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accelerating globalization of leading economies had a significant
effect on the structure of global consumer goods industries.17 The
marketing and logistical strategies of the leading firms began to
converge as they switched from a regional to a global focus. Multi-
market competition emerged between a small group of large mul-
tinational firms with high levels of marketing knowledge. A key
aspect of this corporate globalisation strategy in the alcoholic bev-
erages industry was to acquire existing regional brands which were
believed to have the potential to become global, so that the acquir-
ing firm could rapidly obtain market share in new geographic re-
gions, while maintaining high levels of control over implementation
in terms of costs and time.18 During this period, new opportunities
appeared in some emerging markets in Africa, Latin America, and
Asia where rising incomes stimulated an interest in western life-
styles and brands.
The net result of all these changes is that ownership of
brands in food, drink and cosmetics is now highly concentrated
on a small group of multinationals: Bacardi, Diageo, Danone,
Louis Vuitton Moët-Hennessy (LVMH), Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute, L’Oréal, Procter & Gamble (P&G), Unilever and Nestlé.
Amongst the many brands owned by these firms are the world’s
most valuable brands.19
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL SUCCESS: SINGLE-FIRM BRANDS
Some brands were able to become globally successful while re-
maining, throughout their lives, under the management of the per-
sonality-centred entrepreneurs who created them (often the founders
of firms) or their descendants. Other brands only become successful
when they change ownership, and become managed by organisation-
centred entrepreneurs distinct from those who created them.
17 See, for instance the case of alcoholic beverages Teresa da Silva Lopes, Global
Brands (New York, 2007).
18 This route of expansion can have both advantages and disadvantages. On the one
hand, firms may acquire large portfolios of complementary brands. On the other hand,
problems of brand rationalisation may arise due to the acquisition of brands that com-
pete with ones already in the firms’ existing portfolios.
19 Johnson & Johnson and Colgate-Palmolive are also included in this group of multinationals.
Interbrand, Best Global Brands 2006 - A Ranking by Brand by Value (2006).
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BRANDS CREATED AND RETAINED BY SMALL HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS
Examples of brands which became successful and global un-
der the management of their original entrepreneurs or their de-
scendants are the Danish beer Carlsberg and the fashion brand
Gucci. But there are differences in the ways these brands devel-
oped. Carlsberg achieved international success soon after it was
created, while Gucci achieved success several years after its crea-
tion. However, both became global brands only after their original
entrepreneurs had died.
Carlsberg beer was produced for the first time in 1847 after
J. C. Jacobsen created a new lager beer that was stronger and had
higher quality than its competitors in Denmark.20 .The early suc-
cess of the brand Carlsberg is not associated with the domestic
market, but also with its exports. The firm started exporting to the
United Kingdom in 1868. By the end of the twentieth century
Carlsberg was one of the most global beer brands in the world.
Currently around ninety five percent of Carlsberg sales are gener-
ated outside the home market.21 After World War II, the firm
started intense marketing campaigns to sell more beer abroad.22
Between 1958 and 1972 exports had tripled, and Carlsberg estab-
lished breweries in Europe and Asia. In 1969 Carlsberg also
merged with its major Danish competitor Tuborg.23 Slogans such
as ‘Carlsberg is probably the best lager in the world’ were also
launched in the 1970s.24 The advertising still emphasises the inter-
20 One of those competitors was Jacobsen’s son, Carl Jacobsen, who established a
production unit in an Annexe of J.C. Jacobsen plant in 1871 producing a beer branded
as Ny Carlsberg. The use of a similar brand name by  the son, led J.C. Jacobsen to
sue his son. Both breweries were united under the same ownership - a foundation
- in 1902, after the death of both father and son. Kristof Glamann, Jacobsen of
Carlsberg – Brewer and Philantropist (Copenhagen, 1991), 216-17.
21 In 2005 Carlsberg sold 3.4 mil hl of beer in Denmark out of 68.9 m hl sold in total.
Carlsberg, Annual Report and Accounts, 2005.
22 Glamann, Jacobsen of Carlsberg. For instance, Carlsberg had around 42-44 percent
of the Danish market in the 1920s.
23 In 1968 it made its first investment in a foreign market by setting up brewing
operations in Malawi, and 1969 it created it first licensing agreement in Cyprus. An
important step in its process of internationalization strategy was the joint venture
created with Grand Metropolitan in 1974 to sell Carlsberg in the UK, in a period
when tastes were changing towards lighter beers in that market. The United
Breweries Ltd., Annual Reports and Accounts, 1969/70; 1970/71; 1975/76.
24 This slogan was launched in the UK in 1975 with a voice over by Orson Wells.
United Breweries, Annual Report and Accounts, 1975/76.
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national prestige image of the brand and also the original values
of the founder (J. C. Jacobsen) of heritage and high quality.25 The
fashion brand Gucci also became successful while its creator was
alive even though that occurred later in his life. The House of
Gucci was founded as a saddlery shop in Florence in 1881. But it
was only in the 1920s that Guccio Gucci started producing luxury
luggage. He learned that his clients were gradually replacing equine
transportation with horseless carriages and that luggage func-
tioned as a symbol of affluence and taste. In the 1950s Guccio
Gucci diversified in other luxury items such as ties, shoes and
handbags sporting a bamboo handle. He died in 1953 and his
family took the successful company to new heights by opening
stores in fashionable locations such as Paris, Beverly Hills, London,
Palm Beach and Tokyo.26 During the 1980s the brand suffered
some erosion due to family disagreements and over-licensing, and
was sold out to InvestCorp in Bahrain, which failed to improve
the global image of the brand. In the 1990s under new ownership
Gucci was brought back to centre of chic. In the late 1990s the
threat of its acquisition by Bernard Arnauld, the owner of Louis
Vuitton Moët-Hennessy (LVMH), led the management of the firm
to sell it to another French multinational Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute, which invested highly in Gucci’s global image.27
BRANDS CREATED BY LARGE MULTI-BRAND FIRMS
Carlsberg and Gucci both represent brands that were created
by small firms which then retained ownership of a single brand
and which over time delegated the control of the brand to profes-
sional teams. The controlling family successfully adapted from
being personality-centred entrepreneurs to organisation-centred
entrepreneurs over several generations (although the Gucci family
finally sold out). Other brands, however were created by large
firms which already had one or more existing brands under their
control. In this case it was the organisation-centred entrepreneurs
25 Interview with Bjarre Maurer, Carlsberg Communications, Copenhagen 18 May
2001; United Breweries, Annual Reports and Accounts, 1969/70; Carlsberg, Annual
Report and Accounts, 2005.
26 P. Trimarico, Gucci: Business in Fashion (London, 2001); Gerard McKnight, Gucci:
A House Divided (New York, 1987); Sara G. Forden, The House of Gucci: A
Sensational Story of Murder, Madness, Glamour and Greed (New York, 2001).
27 ‘Don’t Mix your Designers’, The Economist, 14 January 1999; ‘Cockfight’, The
Economist, 25 March 1999; ‘Premium Blend’, The Economist, 22 October 2004.
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who were running these firms that adapted their organisations in
order to foster intrapreneurship, and thereby enhanced their ca-
pabilities to innovate new brands. The advantage of innovation by
a large firm is that once the brand takes off, the firm already has
access to the skills and the capital required to develop it. Such
development includes rejuvenation, globalisation, and possible
extension to other products. It might be expected, however, that
the brands created by a team of managers led by an organisation-
centred entrepreneur do not represent such a radical innovation
as those effected by successful smaller firms, and the evidence
suggests that this is indeed the case. The new brands created were
often closely related to existing brands possessed by the firm, and
may, for certain purposes, be seen as natural extensions of them.
This is illustrated by the case of Asahi Super Dry discussed below.
By contrast, Nescafé and KitKat were radical innovations which
bore little relationship to its creator’s existing portfolio of brands.
An entrepreneurial CEO of a large firm may authorise his mar-
keting department to carry out market research designed to identify
emerging product niches which remain to be filled. The newly dis-
covered niches can then be filled either by the extension of an ex-
isting brand (as in the case of Asahi Super Dry), or the creation of
a new brand, or some compromise between the two (as in the case
of Nescafé below). The firm may also hire new managers and con-
sultants in order to temporarily boost the creative resources at the
firm’s disposal (as in the case of KitKat). A more permanent solu-
tion may be obtained by changing the firm’s recruitment policies,
and hiring new managers with stronger entrepreneurial capabilities.
The Japanese beer Asahi Super Dry launched in 1987 by
Asahi Brewery as an extension of Asahi Draft beer, was in fact
based on a revolutionary innovation which was product based (its
ingredients and production process). In the late 1980s the Japanese
beer industry was suffering a variety of demographic, dietary,
social, economic and distribution changes that affected the de-
mand for beer. Whereas Japanese consumers traditionally exhib-
ited strong brand loyalty and conservative taste, the modern
drinkers were eager to try new types of beer.28 This was also a
28 Asahi Brewery, Annual Report and Accounts (1988); Tim Craig, ‘The Japanese Beer
Wars: Initiating and Responding to Hyper-Competition in New Product
Development’, Organization Science, Vol.7, No.3 (1996): 302-321.
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difficult period for the firm, which was on the edge of bankruptcy
and was therefore sufficiently desperate to risk a frontal attack on
the industry leader, Kirin. Asahi Super Dry, targeted an
unexploited niche of the Japanese market koku-kire, “rich in taste
and yet also sharp and refreshing.” The level of sales not only
surpassed those of any other brand owned by the firm but led
Asahi Brewery in 2002 to become Japan’s top beer brand.29
Nescafé soluble coffee is another illustration of a global brand
which was launched by a team of managers in a large multi-brand
multinational.30 Since the late nineteenth century, with the devel-
opment of modern consumer society, there were several attempts
by entrepreneurs to produce a soluble coffee. The First World War,
due to the supply for troops, increased that demand. But the
products offered did not correspond to the aroma of a coffee
from freshly roasted beans, were not durable, were too expensive
and not satisfactorily soluble in a liquid.31
Nescafé was created by Nestlé from Switzerland in 1938.32 The
new brand resulted from a combination of internal motivations
within the firm and external opportunities. Nestlé, was starting to
suffer an economic crisis due to its high reliance in two major mar-
ket segments – mothers and babies.33 Nestlé’s management felt it
was important to find a product to target men.34 Nestlé had invest-
ments in the Brazilian market since the 1920s. In the early 1930s the
board of Directors of the Banque Française et Italienne pour
29 Kirin, Annual Report and Accounts (1966); ‘Asahi Pushes Kirin out of Pole Position’,
Financial Times (21 February 2002); ‘Japan’s Beer Wars’, The Economist, 26 February
1998.
30 Henri Nestlé started producing formula milk in 1843 in Switzerland. He tried to
convince doctors, pharmacists and hospitals, but it is the mothers that start using his
formula milk after evidence that he had saved a premature baby. In 1905 Nestlé
merged with the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Company, and throughout the 1920s
and 1930s continued growing acquiring other companies. After the World War II
Nestlé diversified by first creating an alliance with the chocolate producer Vevey,
and subsequently merging with this firm. In 1947 by merging with Maggi (a large
Swiss multinational famous for its sauces and soups).
31 Albert Pfiffner, ‘A Real Winner One Day: The Development of Nescafé in the 1930s’
in Roman Rossfeld (Hrsg.), Genuss und Nüchternheit. Geschichte des Kaffees in der
Schweiz vom 18 (Baden, 2002).
32 Rapport au Conseil d’Administration, Séance du 10 Juin 1928 à Cham’; Nestlé
Historical Archive.
33 Heer, Nestlé – 125 Years.
34 Letter from E. Muller (Vice President Nestlé) to J. W. Gwynn (Managing Director
of N.M.P. Ltd.), 15 April 1937; Nestlé Historical Archive.
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l’Amérique approached Nestlé’s management with a view to get
some help to foster the consumption of coffee on account of the
excess stocks they had in Brazil.35 Nestlé’s laboratories started re-
search to try to find a dry coffee extract which could be prepared
instantaneously, having appointed to main chemists - Bakke and
Morgenthaler. After 4 years of unsuccessful research Nestlé manage-
ment decided to abandon the project. However, one of the scientists
Morgenthaler continued the experiments on his own account, until
he found an adequate formula for instant coffee in 1936. After
showing Nestlé’s management his findings, the company decided
to launch the product.36As soon as it was launched in 1938,
Nescafé instant coffee quickly became very popular.37
This merger opened Nestlé’s business to world markets. Jean
Heer, Nestlé – 125 Years (Vevey, 1991); Roger Priouret, ‘Comment
la Suisse acquit une industrie alimentaire de dimension mondiale’,
Le Figaro, 6 September 1966; ‘Global Confederation where the
Whip is seldom Cracked – Nestlé Alimentana S.A.’, The Financial
Times, 16 July 1969.
KitKat is another good illustration of a brand launched by a
firm in a difficult period,38 which overcame its internal problems by
hiring new managers and also consultants. The aim was to create a
line outside of the direct Cadbury chocolate competition.39 The
product was created by Rowntree in 1935 and was initially branded
as ‘Chocolate Crisp’, having changed its name to KitKat in 1937.40
The 1930s was a period when Rowntree was almost facing bank-
ruptcy, and as a result of that the firm hired new professional man-
agers, among which was George Harris, who also married into the
Rowntree family. Harris emulated the successful strategy for the
35 Letter from E. Muller to H. Kuhlmann, Rio de Janeiro, 18 March 1937; Nestlé
Historical Archive, SG 11 541.
36 M. Morgenthaler, ‘La Naissance du Nescafé’, Bulletin Nestlé (1944), Nº2;
‘Cinquante ans de Nescafé!’, Nestlé Gazette(April 1988), Nº2.
37 Rapport au Conseil d’Administration, Séance du 10 Juin 1938 à Cham; ‘Roasters Turn
to Soluble Coffee Business: Roasters Caught in Prize Squeeze find Solubles a
Possible Solution’, Tea and Coffee Trade, March 1953; Soluble coffee: what caused
phenomenal sales increases?, Tea and Coffee Trade (1953), 105, Nº3.
38 Chairman’s Reports on York to General Board, 1933-1935’, Rowntree Archive, R/B/2/2.
39 ‘Notes by WW on the Achievement of the Business in 1932 in sales and profits, and
the factors contributing’, Rowntree Archive, R/B4/WW/1.
40 The brand KirKat was first registered by Rowntree in 1911 and renewed in different
periods since then (1925, 1939, 1953, 1967). Register relating to applications for the
Registration of Trademarks, Rowntree Archives, Borthwick Library, R/DP/F/19.
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penetration of Mars in the British market, by creating new brands
to target niche markets. Aided by the new technique of market re-
search and the flair of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency,
a stream of winning products such as KitKat were launched. By the
outbreak of World War II, Rowntree had undergone a marketing
revolution and recouped much of the ground lost to its rivals.41
Rowntree’s internationalization starts after 1945 not only through
exports but also through foreign direct investment in markets such
as Australia, Canada, South Africa and Ireland.42 By early 1950s the
growth of the firm meant that it created separate product divisions,
each with a different marketing manager (confectionary, grocery
and chocolate), and also marketing strategy committees.43 However,
Rowntree failed to diversify successfully in the 1960s, the same
decade when the confectionary market stagnated and international
competition intensified. This led to the merger in 1969 with Mack-
intosh, another confectioner with brands such as Rolo and Quality
Street.44 Like the merger between Cadbury and Schweppes, the
combine looked forward to combining two strongly marketing-ori-
ented companies in confectionary and grocery, and obtain econo-
mies in marketing, distribution and production planning.45
Rowntree-Macintosh was acquired by Nestlé in 1988 in a hostile
takeover. Despite its very respectable financial performance and its
innovative record, Rowntree was perceived as an underperformer
in stock market terms, as there was a generalized view that the
company could have done better in the past twenty years.46 The
41 Other brands launched in this period were Aero, Smarties and Black Magic choco-
lates. Robert Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution, 1862-1969
(Cambridge, 1995).
42 File with Information about Overseas and Exports Division, Rowntree Archive R/DH/
SC/16 .
43 Letter from 1952 with the retirement of G. J. Harris. Rowntree Archive, R/B3/LO/1
44 Letter from Donald Barron (Chairman of Rowntree) to the Shareholders of
Mackintosh announcing the merger (22 May 1969), Rowntree Acchive R/BJ/BJB/4;
‘Rowntree and Company and John Mackintosh and Sons Limited – Press Release’ (2
April 1969), Rowntree Archive R/B2/5.
45 Rowntree and Company and John Mackintosh and Sons Limited – Press Release (2
April 1969), Rowntree Archive R/B2/5; D. Thomas, ‘How Rowntree Matched
Macintosh’, Management Today (September, 1970): 102-56; T. A. B. Corley, ‘Best
Practice Marketing Food and Health Drinks in Britain 1930-70’, in G. Jones and N.
J. Morgan (edns.), Adding Value – Brands and Marketing in Food and Drink
(London, 1994).
46 ‘The Nestlé Takeover of Rowntree’, Inquiry into Corporate Takeovers in the United
Kingdom (Edinburgh: 1991).
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high price Nestlé paid for Rowntree’s shares reflected the compa-
ny’s powerful brands and their potential for profitable expansion
into world markets. This acquisition by a leading multinational in
chocolate allowed the brand KitKat to become global.47
SMALL FIRMS THAT GROW A BRAND UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF A
LARGER FIRM
A small firm that lacks the large–firm capabilities to develop
the brand it has created may find it more convenient to operate
under a ‘big firm umbrella’ than to attempt to ‘go it alone’. An ex-
perienced large firm may inject capital into the small firm
through long-term trade credit, a loan, or a minority equity stake.
It gives the small firm access to its international marketing and dis-
tribution network, in return for interest payments and a share of
the profit. An interesting example of this strategy concerns the
Mexican beer brand Corona, produced since 1925 by Modelo,
which enjoyed rapid international growth, beginning in the 1980s
when it started forming alliances with the American brewer
Anheuser Busch. In 1998 this leading multinational acquired a 50
percent non-voting stake in Corona’s Grupo Modelo which owned
the leading beer brand in Mexico.
THROUGH ANHEUSHER
Busch which distributes the brand in most of the states, Corona
became the leading imported beer brand in the United States.48
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL SUCCESS: MULTI-FIRM BRANDS
The brands in Table 1 tend to change ownership in two main
ways: by merger and acquisition, or by arm’s length contract.
Mergers and acquisitions have been the most common form
through which brands have moved their ownership. While in
acquisitions one of the firms obtains control over the net assets
and operations of another, in mergers the shareholders pool their
assets and jointly control them.49Acquisitions have been more
important than mergers in the food, drink and cosmetics indus-
47 Heer, Nestlé – 125 Years, 449-457; ‘Nestlé Offers £2.1 Billion for Rowntree’, Herald
Tribune, 27 April 1988.
48 Anheuser Busch, Annual Report and Accounts (2005); ‘Modelo Sharpens Overseas
Focus and it Rides Bumpy Road in the US, Impact (15 November 2005).
49 International Accounting Standards (Rochester: Staples Printers, 1996).
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tries. Contractual arrangements may involve either the sale or the
licensing of the brand.
Acquisitions by organisation-centred entrepreneurs Starbucks
coffee, Perrier water, Evian water, Lâncome and Helena Rubinstein are
all examples of brands which only became successful global brands
after changing ownership, and becoming managed by entrepreneurs
who acquired them from their creators (or their successors). Starbucks
is a relatively young coffee brand created in 1971 by two entrepreneurs
Bowker and Baldwin who started selling it as high quality coffee in
Seattle. Another entrepreneur, Howard Schultz, who at the time
worked in a different business realized that the baby boomers in the
United States were starting to reject pre-packaged food in favour of
more natural and higher quality products. In 1981 Schultz contacted
this Seattle company about the possibilities of transforming their busi-
ness into a high quality national business, re-creating the Italian bar-
culture in their home market. The management of Starbucks hired
Schultz in 1981, but in 1983 he left to start his own coffee chain called
Il Giornale. In 1987 Starbucks came up for sale, and Schultz’s chain
bought it, from which time Schultz began to internationalize the
brand. It was his understanding of the changing social trends that led
him to promote premium coffee sold in a relaxed and informal retail
environment. The powerful brand was a key factor of success helping
create a mass market for speciality coffee.50
In 1898 ‘Perrier’, a medical researcher and proponent of the
virtues of thermal water, applied for a variety of patents and es-
tablished the ‘Société des Eaux Minérales, Boissons et Produits
Higiéniques de Vergeze’. Using English capital from 1903, the firm
first sold Perrier in England and the British Empire. Only in 1933
did it turn to the French market, merging in 1936 with Eaux
Minérales de Vergèze. In 1947 it was acquired by Gustave Leven
who, through mergers and acquisitions of other water springs and
mass advertising, revolutionized the bottled water business and
caught his main competitors, Evian and Vittel.51
50 Howard Schultz and Dori Jones Yang, Pour Your Heart into It; How Starbucks Built
a Company one Cup at a Time (New York, 1997); ‘Howard Schultz and Starbucks
Coffee Company’ in Nancy F. Kohen, Brand New – How Entrepreneurs Earned
Consumers’ Trust from Wedgwood to Dell (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
51 Douglas A Simmons, Schweppes The First 200 Years (Ascott, 1983); Gilles de Bure,
Perrier by Perrier (Barcelona, 2001); ‘Chantée par Valéry’, L’Éxpress, 28 June 1965;
‘De l’Eau Minérale au Conditionnement – Le groupe Perrier a Realise sa Proper
Verrerie à Vergèze’, Les Echos, 15 May 1974.
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In the mid-1970s, Leven took the brand to the United States,
despite being advised by several consulting firms that it would be
foolish to try to sell sparkling water in the land of Coca Cola and
‘gin and tonic’ drinkers. The saturation of the French market, and
the campaigns against soft drinks with added sugar, had served as
strong incentives for this investment decision. Its immediate suc-
cess created a substantial market in the United States for bottled
water.52 The marketing of Perrier positioned it as a status drink for
the fashionable and affluent.53
The opportunities afforded by the global potential of the
brand, coupled with the high cost of transporting and distributing
a bulky low-value product like water, created a strategic need to
control international distribution, Perrier therefore began to ac-
quire other water firms which held dominant positions in other
foreign markets. For instance, in 1980 Perrier group acquired
several American bottled water firms with a strong regional pres-
ence, such as Poland Spring Corp. and Calistoga Mineral Water
Co, in order to reduce the costs of shipping water great distances.
Leven also continued investing heavily in marketing by creating
different adverts such as ‘De l’eau qui fait Pschitt’.54 In 1992
Perrier was acquired by Nestlé, after Leven retired and the brand
started suffering some erosion.55 During this decade Nestlé turned
Perrier into a truly global brand and invested more in the bottled
water business, by acquiring sources such as San Pellegrino min-
eral water. In 1999 Nestlé started rolling out its Nestlé Pure Life
bottled water and in 2003 acquired Hutchison Wham Powwow
and also Clear Water, a bottled-water home and office delivery
company located in Russia.
Evian bottled water provides another case in which the brand
was developed after the firm was purchased. Evian water is differ-
entiated from most other bottled water brands in that the product
is not filtered or processed in any way. Source Cachet, the spring
52 ‘Perrier: soif d’OPE’, Le Figaro – Économie, 6 Mars 1989.
53 A Business Information Report from Business Trend Analysis, ‘The Bottled Water
Market’ (1986).
54 ‘Competition Stiffens for Perrier’, Hérald Tribune, 1 Nov. 1988.
55 The European Commission ruled that Volvic, should be disposed. Volvic was then
acquired by the French group BSN which already had Évian and Badoit. ‘Bruxelles
joue les sourciers avec Perrier’, La Croix L’Événement, 24 July 1992; ‘Perrier devra
vivre sans le flair de Gustave Leven’, La Tribune de L’Expansion, 2 July 1990.
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from which Evian is obtained, was discovered in 1789 near Mont
Blanc in France. Soon after this discovery a health resort was con-
structed at the site. The beverage was first bottled in 1826 and
sourced from the Chablais foothills in the Haute Savoie region of
France. Until the mid-twentieth century Evian was sold in phar-
macies and could only be bought with medical prescription. It was
only in the 1960s in France, and the mid-1970s in other countries
that bottled water experienced a sudden surge in popularity and
the brand became famous internationally.56 By 1969 Evian was
suffering from a depressed equity market in France and also the
price controls imposed on mineral waters, and ended up being
acquired by BSN (Boussois-Soucho-Neuvesel) whose management
had major marketing capabilities.57 At the time this firm produced
glass bottles, industrial containers, flagons and table glassware.
However, the management of BSN felt that it was loosing its com-
petitiveness in the glass bottle industry, and so it decided to diver-
sify into its contents such as water and beer. In 1973 BSN merged
with Danone, which started to develop the water business glo-
bally.58 Since then Evian’s management has invested in globalising
the brand, being very innovative in the way they bottled the
water. They were the first to develop plastic bottles in 1978; to
switch to plastic screw-tops in 1984; and to introduce handles on
the packages in 1988. These and other innovations allowed Evian
to grow even in periods of stagnation of consumption.59 Currently
Evian is the number one selling brand of non-carbonated bottled
water in the world.60
Lancôme in cosmetics is another example of a brand that be-
came globally successful only after it changed ownership. The
brand was created in 1935 by a French entrepreneur Arman
56 ‘Le Français est Buveur d’Eau’, L’Express, 31 Mars 1960; ‘Le Revanche des Buveurs
d’Eau’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 November 1989.
57 ‘Les Sociétés d’Eaux Minerals et la Bourse’, Les Echos, 21 May 1969; ‘La Bataille
de l’Eau Minérale’, Journal des Finances, 7 April 1989.
58 In 1970, as part of its diversification strategy into the production of the contents of
bottles, BSN also acquired two breweries: Kronenbourg and the European Breweries
Company. Business Trend Analysis Inc., ‘The Bottled Water Market’ (1986); Bankers
Trust, ‘Bottled Water: Pan European – Food Producers’ (1999).
59 ‘Eaux Minerals: La Crise du Pétrole Grignote les Profits et les Consommateurs
Contestent l’Utilité des Produits Nouveaux’, Les Echos, 6 September 1974; ‘Evian:
La Bouteille Compactable pour Faire la Différence’, La Tribune, 1 February 1995.
60 KeyNote, ‘Bottled Water – Market Assessment’ (2005).
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Petitjean, who had studied with François Coty, the ‘father of twen-
tieth century luxury perfumes’.61 He launched his first five fra-
grances in 1935 at the Universal Exhibition in Brussels and imme-
diately captured the popular interest. Building upon this initial
success, Petitjean soon expanded beyond his perfume line to offer
a complete range of products, including make-up and skincare
products. During the years that followed, Lancôme continued to
establish its prestigious reputation throughout the world and in-
ternationalized to the United States in the 1950’s, answering a
growing need for quality products. However, it is only from 1964,
when the brand was acquired by L’Oréal, that it developed into a
global brand.62 This was achieved through sophisticated and care-
ful segmentation strategies in which Lancôme was sold through
selected channels of distribution, in France and abroad.63
Helena Rubinstein started in Australia in the turn of the cen-
tury when the personality-centred entrepreneur opened her first
beauty salon in Melbourne and expanded her line. Helena
Rubinstein was always concerned with internationalizing the brand
and with innovation. Her innovations had a very strong impact in
the cosmetics industry in the twentieth century. She was the first
to sell cosmetics in large department stores through mini beauty
institutes; she was the first creator of a waterproof mascara (in
1939); and was also the first to include vitamins in cosmetics (vi-
tamin C, vitamin A and phosphor). In the 1950s Helena Rubinstein
was, along with Elizabeth Arden, one of the most popular luxury
beauty product suppliers in the United States. However, by the
early 1980s the brand was being sold in United States drugstores
at very cheap prices and was not receiving much merchandising
support.64 It had a much better position outside the United States,
in particular in Europe, Japan and Asia, where it was still consid-
61 Randall Bruce Monsen, A Century of Perfume: The Perfumes of François Coty
(Atlanta, 2001).
62 Hubert Bonin, Carole Pailhé and Nadine Polakowski, ‘The French Touch:
International Beauty and Health Care at L’Oréal (since 1907)’, in Hubert Bonin et al
(eds.), Transnational Companies (Paris, 2001); François Dalle, L’Aventure L’Oréal
(Paris, 2001); Geoffrey Jones et al, ‘L’Oréal and the Globalization of American
Beauty’, Harvard Business School Case N0.805-086 (Boston, 2005).
63 The different channels of distribution corresponded to distinct economic levels as
well as different purchasing habits. Jones et al, ‘L’Oréal and the Globalization of
American Beauty’.
64 Lindy Woodhead, War Paint: Madame Helena Rubinstein and Miss Elizabeth Arden.
Their Lives, Their Times, Their Rivalry (Chichester, 2004); Kathy Peiss, Hope in a
Jar: The Making of America’s Beauty Culture (Kinlough, 1999).
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ered up-market. Its various owners throughout the 1980s, such as
Colgate Palmolive and Albi International, did not invest in the
elitist image of the brand. The acquisition of Helena Rubinstein by
L’Oréal in 1987, as part of its strategy to cover all the different
segments of the beauty market, transformed the brand into a truly
global upmarket brand.65 However, it took ten years for the
changes in international distribution strategy to become effective.66
MERGER OF LARGE FIRMS
The merger between Cadbury and Schweppes is an illustra-
tion of the advantages for brands from having owners combining
resources. Cadbury was set up as a shop in the centre of Birming-
ham in 1824, and sold tea, coffee, cocoa, patent hoops and mus-
tard. In 1831 John Cadbury decided to concentrate on the manu-
facture and marketing of cocoa, so he sold the shop to a relative.
The firm became Cadbury Brothers in 1847, and the first major
breakthrough came in 1866 when the second generation of
Cadbury Brothers introduced an improved cocoa into Britain.67
Cadbury built up a large export trade in chocolate and confection-
ary before 1914, and invested in overseas manufacturing after
World War I in the British Empire and the Commonwealth.68 In
1919 Cadbury merged with J. S. Fry & Son, a family firm dating
back to 1728, which had been the leading company in the indus-
try.69 The first directors which were non-family members were
appointed in 1943, even though the firm was only floated on the
stock market in 1962. By 1960 low product growth and intense
competition from rivals compelled the management of Cadbury to
diversify into sugar confectionary, cakes and convenience foods.
Unable to generate sufficient product diversity internally, Adrian
65 In the 1960s only 3 percent of its volume of sales were in foreign markets. In 2000
over 50 percent of its sales were outside Europe. L´Oréal process of transformation
of local brands into global brands has two stages which overall take about ten years:
the first stage consists of choosing the brands that have the potential to become
global. To pass to the next stage the brand has to sell to a critical mass. ‘Comment
L’Oréal Mondialise’, Le Figaro – Économie, 29 October. 2001.
66 Interview with Mr. Le Grand, Marketing Manager for L’Oréal, Paris, 10 June 2002;
‘Béatrice Dautresme, la potion magique d’Helena Rubinstein’, The Figaro, 2
November 1999.
67 ‘Introducing Cadbury Schweppes, 1969’, Cadbury Archive; J.A. Williams, The Firm
of Cadbury, 1831-1931 (London, 1931), 5-40.
68 Geoffrey Jones, ‘Multinational Chocolate: Cadbury Overseas, 1918-1939’, Business
History, 26 (1984): 59-76
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Cadbury merged his company with Schweppes in 1969. This
merger allowed the combined firm to achieve economies in distri-
bution and product development.70
BRANDS SOLD AS PIECES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The gin Bombay Sapphire is an example of a brand that was
sold by the firm that owned it, and which continued to trade in-
dependently of the firm that had acquired the brand. The brand
was launched in 1987 by International Distillers and Vintners
(IDV) which became a subsidiary of Grand Metropolitan, who
used attractive ingredients, innovative design (blue bottle) and a
new recipe (more spicy and more lemon than competitor brands
such as Gordon) to capture the market share.71 The brand changed
ownership, not because its new owners failed to exploit it success-
fully, but because the firm that owned it merged with another
firm. This merger between two leading British multinationals in
alcoholic beverages – Guinness and Grant Metropolitan – formed
Diageo, whose dominance of the market led to anti-trust concerns
in the US. To avoid a confrontation with the US Federal Trade
Commission, Diageo’s management decided to sell Bombay.72 The
brand was sold to Bacardi in 1998, the year after the merger.73
This sale mainly involved the intellectual property repre-
sented by the name of the brand, although some stocks and the
recipe were traded too. Bacardi retained the essential components
of the brand: the distinctive bottle, the recipe and the ingredients.
However, major changes were introduced elsewhere – to speed up
the distribution process, and to enhance the premium image
through heavy advertising and higher prices.74 Following its acqui-
69 ‘Talk given by Sir Egbert Cadbury’ (South Africa 1965), Cadbury Archive; Iolo A.
Williams, The Firm of Cadbury, 1831-1931 (London, 1931).
70 ‘Schweppes plus Cadbury’, Times, 30 January 1969; Derek F. Channon, The Strategy
and Structure of British Enterprise (London, 1973); T. A. B. Corley, ‘Best Practice
Marketing of Food and Health Drinks in Britain 1930-70’, in Geoffrey Jones and
Nicholas J. Morgan (eds.), Adding Value – Brands and marketing in Food and Drink
(London, 1994); G. Foster, ‘The Cadbury Schweppes Mix’, Management Today
(April, 1970): 64-73.
71 Interview with Chris Searle, Brand Manager at Bacardi and former brand manager at
International Distillers and Vintners, London, 22 January 2004.
72 Interview with Jack Keenan, former CEO of Diageo, London 31 October, 2003.
73 The two brands were acquired by Bacardi for £1.15 billion (US$1.9 billion) in 1998.
74 Interview with Chris Searle, Global Marketing Manager for Bombay - Bacardi, London
22 January 2004.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, BRANDS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL BUSINESS
Organizações em contexto, Ano 3, n. 6, dezembro 2007 203
sition, the global sales of Bombay grew from 0.5 million bottles in
1998 to 1.4 million bottles in 2004.75 By moving to a smaller
multinational the brand became relatively more important in the
firm’s overall portfolio, and so received more attention by the top
management of the firm.
TRANSFER THROUGH LICENSING AGREEMENTS
The fragrances Calvin Klein, Hugo Boss and Dior exemplify
the transfer of control of a brand through a licensing agreement,
which gives one firm the rights to produce and distribute a prod-
uct originated by another, for a given number of years and in a
given set of countries.
Calvin Klein is known for its designer jeans, and for its whole-
some all-American look. Over the years Calvin Klein diversified into
other related business such as underwear, fragrances, swimwear,
home décor and cosmetics. It entered the fragrances market with the
launch of fragrances for men: Obsession in 1981 and Eternity in
1988. This was a period when the perfume industry caught on to the
ideal of the sensitive, successful 1980s man, and decided that they
were ready for their own fragrances. In 1989 Unilever signed a li-
censing agreement to produce Calvin Klein fragrances under the
Calvin Klein brand. Even though this business appeared to present
international growth opportunities, in 2005 Unilever disposed of
these licenses, as part of its strategy to withdraw from premium
cosmetics (Elizabeth Arden had been sold in 2001). While under the
ownership of Unilever the brand became global. The license was
acquired by Coty Inc, a large US cosmetics family firm, which be-
came the world’s largest manufacturer of mass-market fragrances.76
Hugo Boss has been a globally successful brand name in
men’s apparel since 1923. In the light of the general trend towards
greater use of fragrances by men, Hugo Boss entered into a licens-
ing agreement with the American consumer products giant Procter
& Gamble in 1993 for the production of fragrances with the Hugo
Boss brand name. This was the first investment of Procter &
Gamble in the fragrances business, and with that investment they
were able to achieve global leadership in men’s fragrances.77
75 Impact International - Database.
76 Geoffrey Jones, Renewing Unilever: Transformation and Tradition (Oxford, 2005).
77 Davis Dyer et al, Rising Tide: Lessons from 165 years of Brand Building at Procter
& Gamble (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); ‘Alan Lafley: Procter & Gamble veut grandir
dans les cosmétiques et les parfums’, Les Echos, 8 January 2003.
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The perfume Dior provides a similar story. Dior is a brand
created after World War II which became very fashionable soon
after it was launched, symbolising luxury rather than comfort.
During the 1970s the brand suffered some erosion when the firm
started licensing its trademark Dior for the production of other
items, such as household products, towels and sheets and fra-
grances. Parfums Christian Dior was sold to Moët & Chandon in
1971 (after the company made a preliminary acquisition of shares
in 1968). 1971 was also the year Moët & Chandon merged with
Hennessy.78 From 1984, when Bernard Arnauld became senior
manager of the fashion and retail company Financière Agache, he
terminated all the licences of Dior that were harmful to its image,
and in the process purchased Louis Vuitton Moët-Hennessy which
had the Dior fragrances and cosmetics business. Under the own-
ership of this global multinational in luxury products the brand
became more avant garde.79
REJUVENATION
It was noted at the outset that large firms acquire brands from
small firms because they have the organisational skills and financial
resources to rejuvenate brands on a regular basis. If rejuvenation
were simply a matter of ‘tweaking’ the brand image to appeal to a
new generation of consumers then it is quite possible that a small
family firm would have sufficient resources for this purpose – if the
brand were profitable then the rejuvenation could be funded out of
retained profits. It would only be if the ageing founder, or his suc-
cessors, had lost touch with recent social trends that were influenc-
ing their consumers that they might need to relinquish control of
the brand in order that it could be rejuvenated.
In practice, however, there is often more to rejuvenation than
this. Rejuvenation of the brand may require the development of
a global image rather than a local or national image. Increased mo-
bility of consumers, and their demand for a product that is always
78 ‘JPMW/IS’ (Sep. 1984), and ‘The New Group - Moët Hennessy’ (1971), both at
Moët Hennessy Archives, Epernay; Moët Hennessy, Annual Report and Accounts,
1970/71.
79 ‘LVMH drinks to new shareholders’, Financial Times, 11 July 1988; ‘France’s old
managerial order is changing – A disputed touch of class’, Financial Times, 7 August
1988; Moët Hennessy, Annual Report and Accounts, 1989.
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available wherever they happen to be, may require a global image
to be supported by a global marketing and distribution system.
The traditional market for a brand may stagnate without dis-
appearing altogether. At the same time, the traditional product
may not be acceptable to a newly emerging market for the brand.
If the firm cannot afford to ignore either of these markets then it
will need two variants of the same brand. The brand therefore
needs to be extended to create an additional product adapted to
the requirements of the new market.
Global marketing and distribution channels incur substantial
fixed costs and need to handle a large volume of product – much
more than any single product line may supply. This provides an
additional cost-based motive for brand extension – namely the
need to develop a comprehensive range of products sold through
similar types of retail outlets whose total volume will keep a global
marketing and distribution centre fully utilised.
Smirnoff, the world’s top spirits in terms of sales, is an illus-
tration of a brand which has successfully rejuvenated through
globalisation and line extension.80 In 1992, when the sales of
Smirnoff were maturing in the British market, Grand Metropoli-
tan launched a line extension called Smirnoff Mule. It was a
ready-to-drink beverage that reconstituted a cocktail prepared in
the 1940s by bartenders in the United States, who mixed the
vodka brand with imported ginger ale and lime. This cocktail was
called “Moscow Mule” and greatly contributed to the establish-
ment of Smirnoff as a vodka brand on the West Coast of the
United States.81 The idea belonged to the managing director of
Heublein’s, who thought that he could teach Americans to use
vodka in mixed drinks. Moscow Mule eventually became a very
80 Smirnoff was created in 1864 in Russia, which was drunk by the royal family. In
1933 a former US supplier of the brand, bought the American rights to produce it.
In 1939 Heublein a US firm, which in the mid-1980s was the leading multinational in
the world, bough the brand. In 1987 Heublein was in financial difficulty and was
starting not to be able to invest in the brand, and Grand Metropolitan, which had the
right to distribute Smirnoff in Europe and saw its potential to become a global brand.
This led to the acquisition of Heublein In 1997, after Grand Metropolitan merged
with Guinness to form Diageo the brand came to the hands of the world’s largest
multinational. Smirnoff is now part of a limited number of global priority brands, from
which Diageo derives most of its economic profit from several countries. Lopes,
Global Brands.
81 Moscow Mule was first created in 1941, ‘Moscow Mule File’, Heublein Archive,
Diageo.
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popular beverage in bars all over the United States. The launch in
1992 of Smirnoff Mule in the United Kingdom as a ready to
drink beverage was aimed at responding to the problems that
cocktails raised by taking preparation time at the bar and by vary-
ing in quality according to the capacities of the bartender. This
frequently led consumers to drink beer instead. However,
Smirnoff Mule was unsuccessful. It did not have a sufficient ap-
peal to the target market, and the bottle, which was too sophisti-
cated, did not correspond to the content of the beverage. This was
in fact International Distiller and Vintners’ second unsuccessful
attempt to enter the ready-to-drink market. It had previously
launched Saint Leger, a California Wine Cooler, an alternative to
wine and beer. The product failed because the company had not
transferred the knowledge from its wine and spirits business to
the beer market, and had not done sufficient consumer research.82
These unsuccessful ventures were, nonetheless, very useful as
learning experiences for the subsequent launch in 2002 of
Smirnoff Ice, which turned out to be very successful. Smirnoff
Ice’s imagery was very different from that of Smirnoff Mule,
being much less sophisticated and more connected with the spirits
brand. The success of Smirnoff Ice was such that it regenerated
consumer interest in the core brand.83
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND RESOURCES
As illustrated previously, in most cases global successful brands
change ownership several times during their lives. It is important to
understand why, and what they acquire with these moves. Usually,
the existing owner lacks the resources to take the next step in the
life of the brand, to globalize it, or to create new line or brand
extensions. It is the recognition of this lack of capacity to exploit the
brand to its full potential that may lead to its sale (on its own or to
together with the firm that owns it). The owner may lack tangible
resources (such as physical assets or capital), or intangible resources
(such as knowledge, which in the case of imagery brands, tends to
82 Interview with Chris Nadin, former Marketing Manager at Grand Metropolitan,
London, 10 December 2003.
83 P. Barwise and T. Robertson, ‘Brand Portfolios’, European Management Journal,
Vol.10, No.3 (1992): 278; David A. Aaker and Kevin Lane Keller, ‘Consumer
Evaluations of Brand Extensions’, Journal of Marketing, Vol.54 (1990): 27-41.
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be marketing knowledge). Often it is a combination of these
motivations that leads to changes in ownership.84
MARKETING KNOWLEDGE
The role of entrepreneur can be crucial in the process of
growth of marketing based firms. For the creation of brands, the
characteristics of the entrepreneurs tend to be similar, irrespective
of the fact that they may own the firm or be hired employers in a
multi-brand firm. This is evident if we compare for example the
characteristics of, the entrepreneur who created Carlsberg with the
entrepreneur who created Nescafé. However, over time, the type of
management and marketing knowledge they require in order to be
nurtured and to develop, changes substantially. At initial stages in
the life of brands, the entrepreneurs-founders of firms or their fam-
ily members tend to have a particular kind of knowledge which is
of a pragmatic and path dependent nature, accumulated over time.
This kind of knowledge is ‘sticky’, as it is unusually complex, dy-
namic and rich in intangible resources, in particular tacit knowl-
edge, which is embedded in its original entrepreneur-founder. Its
transmission, which is a source of competitive advantage, can hardly
be expressed or formalized, appearing and developing through the
interaction between the individual and the situation, becoming
context specific.85 Sticky knowledge has elements of ‘lock-in’ cre-
ated by the entrepreneur. Once employees have got used to and
learned the routines and procedures, they are resistant to new pro-
cedures to deal with a particular set of issues.
The sticky knowledge accumulated over time, is however,
distinct from routines and procedures. While the latter embody
the perception of the business problems and strategic solutions
of the entrepreneur, sticky knowledge resides in the minds of
particular individuals (such as marketing managers or the CEO
of the firm), and is not as easily shared with other people in the
84 D. J. Storey, ‘Firm Performance and Size: Explanations from Small Firm Sectors’,
Small Business, Vol.1, No.3 (1989): 175-180.
85 Explicit knowledge (articulated or codified) is that which can be transferred by way
of a systematized language or code, and there is no need to link it to a very
specific context for it to be meaningful. M. Polany, The Tacit Dimension (London,
1966); I. Nonaka and H. Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company (New York,
1995); I. Nonaka and N. Konno, ‘The Concept of ‘Ba’: Building a Foundation for
Knowledge Creation’, California Management Review, 40 (1998): 40-54.
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organization. Routines and procedures monitor and cope with
short-term volatility, while knowledge represents a strategic re-
sponse to long-term challenges.
The cases previously analysed also how that hired managers,
on the other hand tend to have a different kind of knowledge
which compared to that possessed by family members, tends to
be smooth. Smooth marketing knowledge is of a broad applica-
tion, and can be obtained in the short-term through hiring of
professional managers with entrepreneurial capabilities. This kind
of knowledge contrasts with sticky knowledge in the sense that it
is usually associated with the entrepreneurial activity of hired
managers, who come into the firms and are supposed to act as
‘change agents’ by challenging old procedures followed within
firms. Old sticky knowledge which was once the reason why a
particular brand was successful may have become obsolete and
therefore new entrepreneurial skills have to be created. These
characteristics of marketing knowledge of having the capacity to
be sticky or smooth, are not concerned with the character of the
knowledge per se, but instead with the nature of the practices in
which the knowledge is used.
The process of acquisition of new knowledge within the firm
occurs in various ways – by training, monitoring, and critical
analysis of the mentor who changes the knowledge. This is for ex-
ample, what happened to Mr. Gucci the founder and his son who
succeeded him. Another alternative is to hire professional manag-
ers to manage different areas of the firm and making sure they all
share information and are open and consultative to each others
views. This is the case of KitKat, launched soon after the appoint-
ment of a new manager. While it is relatively easy to hire profes-
sional skills (managers with professional accreditation and mastery
of marketing techniques), it is more difficult to hire entrepreneurs
capable of making difficult judgements and with the ability to
value brands with potential to be rejuvenated and transformed into
successful brands on a global scale.
In small firms entrepreneurs have the availability to manage
both short-term and long-term volatility. As firms grow there will
often be a succession of short-term crises which can prevent the
entrepreneur from thinking about the long-term. Because short-
term volatility is recurrent, however, it is possible to develop rou-
tines and procedures. The skills needed are just those that good
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professionals have, and professionals move between firms. The en-
trepreneur CEO, with the confidence of the shareholders can now
become more specialized and concentrate on long-term trends.
Because of that he is good at valuing brands and looking at its
potential future earnings.
As mentioned by Schumpeter, ‘mechanisms of economic
change in capitalist society pivot on entrepreneurial activity’.86 To
a great extent, this is due to the fact that, the qualities of those
who make decisions are partly determined by, and partly deter-
mine, the social environment within which business takes place.
Similarly, the way the value of marketing knowledge changes
with the transformations in the environment and firms are only
able to succeed by adapting, keeping the routines and procedures
that are still relevant and discarding those that are not.
Before becoming globally successful, the brands analysed in
this study, were able to survive by constantly making small adap-
tations which allowed them to keep their basic routines and pro-
cedures. More radical changes in the environment such as in-
creases in competition and liberalization of markets (characterized
by different preferences and distinct cultures), made it necessary
for entrepreneurs to increase their levels of flexibility and to
adapt by acquiring new forms of marketing knowledge (sticky
and smooth), in order to rejuvenate their brands, and change their
routines and procedures.87
THE LIFE OF BRANDS AND MARKETING KNOWLEDGE
Several researchers in marketing, international business and
strategy, have analysed and linked the stages in the life of prod-
ucts and industries, to the strategies firms follow at a particular
moment in time.88 However, these studies do not address the par-
ticular issue of how to rejuvenate brands at different stages in
their lives, and which entrepreneurs and firms should own these
brands at different times and distinct places.
86 Schumpeter, The Creative Response.
87 This view contrasts with that of Schumpeter, who considers that it is the entrepreneur
that initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary,
taught to want new things. J.A. Schumpeter, ‘The Theory of Economic
Development’, An Enquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business
Cycle. (Cambridge, Mass., 1934): 65-94.
88 See for example Raymon Vernon ‘International Investment and International Trade in
Product Cycle’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80 (1966): 190-207.
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The evidence provided in previous sections shows that there
is an apparent relationship between entrepreneurship, the life of
firms and the life of brands. At early stages in the life of a brand,
it requires marketing knowledge, which is essentially sticky, of a
pragmatic nature, relying essentially on the ideas of the entrepre-
neur who created it. At that stage the brand is essentially local,
having internationalized to a few markets that are culturally and
geographically close. Over time, in its natural growth process and
as a result of homogenisation of consumer tastes and liberalisation
of markets, the brand needs to become global, being sold in mul-
tiple markets around the world. This requires acquiring additional
marketing knowledge. This means having a team of professional
managers to investigate the particular requirements of different
markets. In some cases the family will hire teams of managers in
others it makes sense to sell out to companies that already have
those trams of managers.
In early stages of its life it is possible for brand to remain suc-
cessful if the firm hires more staff who are taught about the rou-
tines and procedures created by the entrepreneur. For the brand
to become global, it is important that the firm acquires smooth
marketing knowledge. This often implies hiring professional mar-
keting managers with entrepreneurial skills, external consultants,
or forming alliances with large multinationals where the firm is
able to learn or use its skills in the international management of
its successful brands. If that is not possible, the firm might sell the
brand to another firm, with those resources. Often firms with
smooth marketing knowledge find they have excess resources (in
the form of marketing knowledge) which can be applied in the
management of wider portfolios of different brands. In these cir-
cumstances they tend to search for new brands with potential to
become global, to add to their portfolios.
CONCLUSION
This study has looked at the role of entrepreneurship in the
growth and survival of global brands in food and drink and also
the cosmetics and fashion industries. Drawing on an extended or
stretched concept of the entrepreneur, it has taken into considera-
tion the self-made man (with strong will to succeed) and also the
hired organization manager (with above average leadership quali-
ties, who is not afraid of challenges and who possesses an inner
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drive to compete and win). The cross-industry and cross-country
comparison, highlighted several main trends, some of which are
due to the life of brands, and others to the development of the
modern economy.
One is that successful global brands tend to originate from
developed countries, where the institutional environment tends to
be more benign (in terms of legislation, consumption, infrastruc-
tures, capital etc); another is that most successful brands are old,
often dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it
takes a long time to build successful personalities for brands and
it is easier to create brand and line extensions. An important trend
is that few brands have remained under the same ownership
throughout their lives, in particular from the 1980s. The liberali-
sation of markets led to new waves of mergers and acquisitions,
and the globalisation of economies. A large number of brands are
now under the ownership of a small group of multinationals in
consumer goods. They tend to change ownership through merg-
ers and acquisitions together with the firms that created them.
However, there are a few cases of brands that were traded as
pieces of intellectual property. Licensing agreements are also com-
mon (for the production and distribution of a different product
using the same brand name, or the same product in a different
geographic market) during fixed periods of time. They often ap-
pear linked to strategies of brand extensions.
This paper has also shown that the original entrepreneurs
who have the ideas and are willing to take risks, their descendants
and teams of managers with sticky knowledge, are better at cre-
ating and building successful brands. Professional managers with
entrepreneurial skills (and smooth marketing knowledge), are
better at acquiring and managing those successful brands and
making them global as part of larger portfolios.
The evolution of brands from local to global may take place
within a single firm, if the firm for instance hires new managers with
entrepreneurial skills, or consultants to give advice on how to reju-
venate brands (in which case the brand can remain under the same
ownership throughout its life). Alternatively, and most frequently,
in order to remain successful and grow the brand might have to
change ownership. Often, as the brand grows, in order to ensure
that it is accepted in a wide range of different countries a large
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amount of information needs to be brought to bear. A single indi-
vidual from a particular background, cannot do it by himself, neither
can a small firm, rooted in a particular country. For that reason the
successful local brand tends to change ownership to become owned
by large organisations which create the environment for teams of
professional managers to behave in entrepreneurial ways similar to
those of the original founders, owners of smaller firms. These man-
agers tend to be employed by an entrepreneurial individual who
understands the contribution they can make. These entrepreneurs
may themselves be qualified in marketing but understand the ad-
vantages of delegation to other professionals.
Rejuvenation and globalisation requires different skills – at these
stages entrepreneurs follow exploitative behaviour by recognising the
trends in the global economy and relating those trends with the rel-
evant sector where they operate. Explorative type entrepreneurs are
more important in stages when the development of the product is
associated with a particular brand which later on becomes successful.
In conclusion, this paper has argued that in order to grow and
remain successful brands need the right combination of tangible
(such as physical assets) or intangible (such as sticky and smooth
marketing knowledge) resources throughout their lives. At early
stages in the life of brands sticky marketing knowledge and ex-
plorative behaviour determines the early success of the brand. At
later stages, smooth marketing knowledge and exploitative behav-
iour becomes crucial.
To stay ‘forever young’ in the eyes of consumers therefore
means that imagery brands (in food and drink, cosmetics and fash-
ion) do not necessarily have to be owned by large managerial firms
– Chandlerian type. It depends on the stage of the life of brands and
the life of firms. The situation obviously changes as we move from
imagery brands to performance brands, where other factors such as
technological innovation should also be taken into consideration.
The findings in this study may well be applied to other indus-
tries where leaders are also multi-brand firms. This is true in many
consumer goods industries, whereas a lot of high tech manufac-
turing industries have essentially single brand firms. Consumer
goods and consumer services in industries such as, the hotel indus-
try, which do not embody advanced manufacturing technologies
in general provide an opportunity to separate the ownership of the
brands with the ownership of the firm, therefore allowing separate
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trade. The ideas presented in this paper may also apply to high
tech single brand firms but with some modification. The separa-
bility of the brand and the firm is not so easy when the technol-
ogy capabilities of the firm involve keeping the brand up to date.
Where advanced technology is required in order to sustain the
quality on which the reputation of the brand is based it is difficult
to separate the brand and the firm because the acquiring firm
would need to have the skills required to have the advanced tech-
nology and skills required to technology up to date. This does not
prohibit the possibility of trading brands but severely restricts the
range of companies you can sell to.
Recebido em 10/11/07
Aceito em 3/12/07
